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ABstrACt
In this study, the existing link between Heidegger’s philosophy 
and the main representatives of Kyoto’s school will be 
demonstrated. For it, a brief synthesis of Nishida and 
Tanabe’s philosophy will be presented; in their conceptions 
about Nothingness, whether as something absolute or 
dynamic that allows the movement of everything else, a first 
matrix can be observed of what for Heidegger represents 
nothingness: the source of all philosophical approaches; 
a something which, upon being, ceases to be or loses its being. 
The article ends with the reference to three consequences 
of this contemporary nihilistic approach: the one which 
sustains the need for a return to faith in order to avoid 
the abysm of nothingness, proposed in Unamuno; the one 
which implies a denial of all hope and the openness to the 
no-sense, implicit in Bataille, Cioran, Camus, and Caraco; 
just as the one which bases a hope of reconstruction on 
Nihilism, according to Vattimo. 
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introduction
The problem of Nothingness has been a persistent topic, generating 
interest from many distinct perspectives. Since Heraclitus, philosophers 
have attempted to understand it. Since Sophocles, intellectuals have 
attempted to describe it. Since the atomists, mathematicians have 
attempted to decipher it, as the Mayans did with the number zero and its 
personification. Theologians like Saint Augustine denied it in order to 
vindicate divinity, while others like Meister Eckhart, unified it with the 
Deity itself. Astronomers have attempted to locate Nothingness beyond 
the world, and since the Stoics it has been understood as beyond the 
universe. Scientists filled with ether that which could be Nothingness, until 
arriving at quantum physics which conceives it in dialectic with Being.
Hence, Nothingness has not only been in distinct disciplines 
of knowledge but is implied in, and related with, the most fundamental 
questions that man may ask himself. Issues such as life and death; 
existenceand non-existence of values; knowledge and its limits; being and 
not-being;change and eternity, Nothingness is always present. How is it, 
then, that something which is always present can be excluded from our 
perception? How can Nothingness, that allows all that which is, not be? 
In the last century, there have been two major approaches to the 
study of Nothingness. In Asia, the Kyoto School, centered on the writings 
of Kitaro Nishida and on Hajime Tanabe, fully maintain the importance 
of the study of nothingness for the comprehension of being; with similar 
intentions, the Western philosopher Martín Heidegger provides a clear 
meditation on the philosophical significance of nothingness. In this paper 
I will present the central postulates of both positions and develop the 
implicit links between them. 
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1. nothingness in the orient: the Kyoto school
There is no possibility of a phenomenology of Nothingness since 
it does not show itself directly. Raimon Panikkar, in the prologue to Los 
filósofos de la nada [Philosophers of nothingness] by James Heisig, 
mentions that “there is no transcultural phenomenological epoché. We 
cannot place our deepest convictions between parentheses. We cannot 
understand outside of our category”.1 In that sense, Nothingness is that 
which in order to be conceptualized must enter the categorical spheres of 
what is. So, upon defining it we make it be, therefore, the Real Nothingness 
is incognoscible. In the same manner it can be affirmed that:
When human thought scrutinizes reality to the maximum 
of its strength, it trips over its own limits. But to discover 
the limit is to become aware that there is an insurmountable 
“beyond”; impassible to thought but not to conscience, 
since we become aware that it is a limit. A great part of 
the Western culture has put the name of God to this limit.2
Now, can we say that Nothingness is and, due to it, submit it to the 
category of what is and what isn’t? Certainly we would have to search for 
another verb for that which is not an object noun, unless we attempted 
to create ontology of Nothingness. Hence, to speak of Nothingness 
supposes to make it something and, in that sense, it becomes impossible 
to speak really of it.
It would seem that Nothingness is a contradiction but, in the end, 
as Panikkar mentions, “reality does not have to be contradictory or not 
contradictory unless it is believed that our “diction” about it affects reality 
in such a way that it exhaustively tells us what it is”.3 Therefore, the 
problem of Nothingness is often not accepted in Western culture, the roots 
of which are bound to Aristotelian thought. Greek thought was unable 
to conceive the status of Nothingness since “the ancient Greeks, who 
developed logic and geometry which constitute the basis of all modern 
mathematics, never introduced the symbol of the zero; they profoundly 
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apprehended the idea”.4 It is to be understood, from there, the impossibility 
that Aristotle could have conceived in terms of Nothingness that which 
he finally called the Unmoved Mover.
Kitaro Nishida and Absolute Nothingness
Returning to the issue of the East, in Kitaro Nishida we have a 
representative of the philosophy of Nothingness in its most radical form. 
Born in Ishikawa, Japan, this philosopher (1870-1945) is considered as 
one of the most important Oriental philosophers. To a large extent, the 
transcendence of the school of Kyoto in the panorama of world philosophy 
is due to his work and philosophical innovation.
Among his main lines of work was the conciliation between the 
intuitive and hardly reflexive conscience of the East with the West’s 
logical and rational conscience. His first book, Indagación del Bien 
[An Inquiry into the Good], shows a Nishida centered on his own ideas, 
creative, and brave in the depths of the ordinary in order to find answers 
about the Absolute.
For Nishida, there was no doubt in affirming that “the most 
important things are the spiritual ones and that the objective of the spirit 
consists in digging deeper and deeper into the nooks and crannies of the 
soul in order to reach the true and authentic self and become one with 
it”.5 The self is the conscience and it is this which unifies reality for the 
individual. So much so, that “to say that our self is consciously active 
is to say that our self, as an expressive point of the world, forms the 
world. For the world to express itself in the self, it must be subjectively 
approved by the self”.6 This subjectivity is situated in the perception of 
the counterparts and such an issue is a fact of the conscience from which 
our conscious world acquires order; in such a way that “we call our self 
the perspective or reflection of the self in its own self”.7 But what we 
conceive as our self is precisely not our self, in such a way that we are 
not what we are; or, stated differently, we are somewhat different to our 
perception of ourselves.
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The affirmation of the Absolute in self-denial is a key element in 
Nishida’s philosophy; so much so that “our self should be understood as 
absolute denial and affirmation as a response to the One, as that which 
is bottomless…”.8 In the grasping of this being bottomless is where the 
liberty which one has already can be found; not the liberty which is to 
be found externally, but rather a liberty that is already possessed; which 
is why, according to Nishida:
Authentic liberty has a place in the point of inflection in 
which the self, through its self-denial, self-affirms itself 
as the self-denial of the One. In this point, the self touches 
the beginning and end of the world. Beginning and end are 
also the alpha and omega of the own self. This is the point, 
stated differently, in which our self acquires consciousness 
of the absolute present.9
In Nishida, there is no isolated self but always a wrapped self. 
That which wraps the self is the Absolute Nothingness; which is why 
the self doesn’t ascend to transcendence like he who climbs a mountain, 
but rather like he who descends to the depths. This is a self which needs 
to deny itself in order to affirm itself, since “it is not about a self that 
affirms and thrusts itself outwards, but instead denies and submerges 
itself to discover a larger self in its depth; it transcends inwards more 
than upwards or outwards”.10
In such a way that in denying oneself and leaving oneself, reality 
is presented such as it is, for one is then (and only then) situated in the 
place of Nothingness. This place is the eternal present that Nishida also 
usually binds to divinity; though this does not suppose a theocentrism, an 
egocentrism, or a cosmocentrism, but rather emptiness from all centers. 
Heisig suggests, “Nishida recognized that the step towards 
ontology of Nothingness was defying a fundamental presupposition in 
philosophy until then”.11 He believed that the fundamental aspect of 
Western philosophy is to have taken the Being as the fundament of reality; 
however, the counterpart is to consider Nothingness as such fundament. 
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We can understand the Being as something absolute but situated in 
something more absolute which even precedes it: Absolute Nothingness. 
The desire of Nishida is bound to the need of the self of denying the self 
and be able to open up to a greater reality that possesses it, from which 
Nothingness could even be a hermeneutic possibility. It is about denying 
the self as a subject that perceives reality and continuing on to the self 
which, denying itself, perceives a greater reality. That is why “this self 
should be made Nothingness or annulled to open up to a truer dimension”.12 
It is about, even more, a denial of the self which is not only rational but 
“a denial constructed on the disciplined effort of dispensing the prejudice 
of seeing oneself as a subject placed in a world of objects”.13 Naturally, 
this supposes a transition from the term nothing, going from the simple 
denial to the metaphysical affirmation of an Absolute distinct from the 
Being: Nothingness.
Now, in regard to the adjective Absolute as referred to Nothingness, 
Nishida tells us that it:
Does not come to be nor cease to be and, in this sense, is 
distinguished from the world of the Being.  It is called an 
Absolute Nothingness – or nothing of the absolute – because 
it cannot be contained by any phenomenon, individual, 
event, or relation in the world. If it is absolute, it is precisely 
because it is not defined by anything in the world of the being 
which would oppose it.  It is absolved from all opposition 
which would make it relative, so it’s only opposition to 
the world of the being is that of an absolute in regard to 
the relative.14
Nishida’s proposal has resulted so radical and contrary to the 
common metaphysical structures of the West, that even more than half 
a century after his death he has not received the necessary grasping nor, 
in many cases, even the required attention. That proves, in part, the 
impossibility of breaking with the blinding categorical structures where 
there is only that.
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Hajime Tanabe and Nothingness as Dynamo
Tanabe (1885-1962) received the invitation from Kitaro Nishida to 
be included in the academic activities of the University of Kyoto, though 
later on they had discrepancies among them. I concur with Hajime when 
he affirms that:
The discipline which has to do with nothing is Philosophy. 
Religion encounters nothing and defeats it in faith, the art 
in sentiment; but only Philosophy is occupied in knowing 
nothing from an academic point of view. Since Aristotle, 
metaphysics has been defined as the study of existence as 
such, of the being per se. But if the being is something 
that can only be concretely known through the mediation 
of nothing, it would be more appropriate for us to define 
philosophy in terms of nothing, despite how paradoxical 
this may seem at first.15
The latter is sufficient to affirm the conception of Nothingness 
in Tanabe as a dynamo which allows the interrelation of all things, an 
“élan vital”16 which supposes the dialectic necessary to comprehend 
things based on their own difference with the observer. This perception 
of Nothingness which Tanabe supposes does not subtract power from 
human will but rather does the contrary. Antagonical to Nishida, he does 
not assume in Nothingness the beginning of the order of reality, but rather 
only the prelude which allows the connection between things, in spite 
of their difference and due to their coincidence in Nothingness which 
permeates them.
2. martin heidegger: the Being of nothingness
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) is possibly the most influential 
German philosopher of the twentieth century. His most important piece 
is Ser y tiempo [Being and Time]. Heidegger has been the most pointed 
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out representative of the contemporary existentialist trend, in spite of his 
reluctance to include himself in it and adopt the term.  
The problem of the meaning of the Being is what worries Heidegger 
the most. For him, such a concept is the indispensable and essential 
presupposition of any other one. The essence or substrate of “existing” is 
precisely the existence in abstract; a way of being which, for Heidegger, 
is equivalent to “being in a world”. Now the Being, in other words the 
essence of existing, is timeliness.  
In his study about the Being, Heidegger appeals to the phenomenological 
method considering that the phenomena are the aspects in which Being 
manifests itself. For Heidegger, the ontology that searches for the true Being 
is only possible as phenomenology. The aforesaid is clearly described in 
the following text: “The question which interrogates about the sense of 
the Being is the one which ought to be posed.  With this we find ourselves 
before the need of elucidating the question which interrogates about the 
Being under the point of view of the structural elements indicated”.17
Further along, Heidegger notes that we, men, tend to the question 
Being but that we have a preconception that, in some way, is the necessary 
though insufficient starting point:
We already always move in a certain comprehension of 
the being.  From it does the question arise which expressly 
interrogates about the sense of the being, and the tendency 
to forge the corresponding concept. We don’t know that 
“being” means.  But then when we ask, “What is being?” 
we remain in a certain comprehension of the “is”, without 
being able to fix onto concepts what “is” means. This 
comprehension of the being, on an intermediate term, is 
a factum18
It is convenient to be aware, however, that this “existing” cannot 
be separated from the concept or experience of one’s own individual 
being. The essence of “existing” is something profoundly ours or, better 
expressed, something essential and irrepressibly individual and human. 
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In parallel, to exist is also to transcend from the ego to the world of 
the noumenal, of everything that is beyond our own selves, this would 
include Nothingness.  
For man, “existing” is always a possibility, something unfinished, for 
it ends with death; in other words, with “ceasing to be”. So, this “existing” 
contains anguish, which is no other thing than the perspective of death; 
this is to say, the connection with the fact of being finite.  Such a concept 
appears essentially bound to time. From it, the title of Heidegger’s main 
masterpiece is derived.
The starting point of various Heideggerian propositions is in the 
concept of the Dasein, which could be translated as the “being-there”. 
But Heidegger uses it to designate the manner of existence proper to 
man; a being which is a nothing but is in time in the manner of a partial 
nothing. This manner of existence implies that, for man, to exist is not 
to be, but rather, to be able to be; this is to say, an existential possibility. 
This necessarily supposes the not-being which has not yet been but which 
supposes its possibility.
The concept of Heidegger’s Dasein turns out to be a conscience of 
existence itself in terms of possibility. However, in the comprehension of 
existence it should not be seen as a cognitive act properly said, but rather 
something more fundamental and original than knowledge; in other words, 
the grasping of a possibility which lies in the execution of existence.19  
What the Dasein vitally explains is the essential finiteness of 
man. The human being is found in the world, given to itself as a fact. Its 
possibilities, since it is born, are exhausted because death is not something 
exterior for him but – on the contrary – something that belongs to his 
essence. Hence, when man forgets or ignores this reality that – is unavoidable 
to him by the fact of existing – he does not live authentically. From this 
unauthentic environment, however, man can exit through anguish; the 
anguish before Nothingness, which reveals to us all of which our ordinary 
existence locks up as artificial, false, and apparent. Anguish, after all, is 
what “reveals his own essence to man”.20 In such thesis about anguish 
is where the influence exerted by Kierkegaard over Heidegger can best 
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be grasped; though the latter, in difference to Nietzsche, does not end 
up positing Nihilism as the final consequence of Awareness but instead 
supposes that anguish is something that the Will cannot avoid due to its 
need of continuing to find answers.  
Man finds himself trapped by the problem of his own being and 
by the experience of his irrepressible loneliness. His anguish flows from 
the conscience of his timeliness like an anemic state which makes man 
project and anticipate himself over the future. However, for every being, 
individually considered, the final future is Nothingness; in other words, 
what follows after his end. And it is in Nothingness as well, paradoxically, 
where man finds the possibility of getting to conquer his own identity, 
getting to be oneself with the death that liberates him from all future.
The previous premises explain the paradoxical conclusion to 
which Heidegger arrives.  Human existence cannot relate itself with the 
being if it is not holding itself within Nothingness. This transcending is, 
precisely, metaphysics. This is why metaphysics belongs to man’s nature. 
In his reflections about thinking, he admits:
That which should be object of thought, moves away from 
man; it is removed from him. But how can we know the 
most minimal aspect; how can we name that which has 
always been removed from us? What escapes from us, 
denies arriving. However it’s removing itself is not merely 
nothing. The removal of itself is an event. What escapes from 
us can incite and affect us more than everything present, 
which comes out to meet us and concerns us.21  
This is why the “sense” or the “future, upon removing itself 
before us, are a pair of concepts that attract us even more. For Heidegger, 
metaphysics is not only a special philosophical discipline, but rather a 
dark “intellective cosmos” into which man’s individual and irrepressible 
existence plunges its roots. This is also Sartre’s starting point.
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Heidegger and Ernst Jünger together made “the most penetrating 
contemporary analysis of the problem of Nihilism […] to the fit of the 
twentieth century”.22 Both assume the centrality of the topic of Nothingness 
in the world, to the point that Jünger mentions that “whoever has not 
experienced over himself the enormous power of Nothingness and does 
not know its temptation, knows very little of our era”.23 For him, the 
emptiness of values and sense pertaining to the era, does not give way 
to a defeatist and negative attitude. On the contrary, it considers a heroic 
Nihilism of the action of such an individual that elevates himself further 
from it. The experience of the interior is what, for Jünger, constitutes a 
type of final barricade before planetary Nihilism, no longer only European 
as Nietzsche considered it. It is advocated for the overcoming of Nihilism 
from Nihilism itself.
In turn, Heidegger is neither so optimist nor does he assume the 
possibility of overcoming Nihilism but, instead, warns that Jünger himself 
must have been absorbed by Nihilism when he considers a static definition 
of the Being; making him lose with it, its substantiality. Therefore, the 
Nihilism overcome by man’s will without the knowledge of Nothingness’ 
being is only the reiteration of Nihilism itself. Even rationalism is, for 
Heidegger, the expression of subjectivity and anthropocentrism which 
allows us to catapult ourselves beyond Nihilism. If one truly desires 
to escape Nihilism, it is necessary to overcome our resistances and to 
not erect weak blockades, but, instead, to allow the enormous power of 
Nothingness to be liberated and all the possibilities of Nihilism to be 
fulfilled. With this, I am completely in agreement and further along I will 
present it when I refer to post-rationalism.
In turn, José Ferrater Mora, in the introduction to a book by 
Priscilla Cohn, mentions that “the notorious Heideggerian being can 
very well result a trip through nothing”.24 In the same way, Cohn dos not 
have any doubt in assuring that the thought of the German philosopher 
is properly a philosophy centered on Nothingness, since:
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In order to demonstrate the importance of Nothingness 
it is more fructifying to attempt to comprehend what 
Heidegger wants to say when he describes the Dasein as 
a being in whose Being its Being fades […] it can almost 
be considered that the totality of El ser y el tiempo [The 
being and time] is an intent to explain – and demonstrate – 
the implications of this description.  I affirm, like this, that 
the Heideggerian notion of the Dasein as a being in whose 
Being its Being fades cannot be deeply comprehended 
without understanding Nothingness.25 
In such a case, as much with Heidegger as with Aristotle, we would 
have to recognize that even centering in on Nothingness they do not call 
it as such; they sketch it, they show it, they caress it without touching it, 
perhaps respecting it too much knowing that Nothingness, upon naming 
it, slightly loses its value for us. Certainly – as has already been said – 
Nothingness does not suppose that understanding it makes us nihilists 
in a pejorative sense. On the contrary: recognizing the magnificence of 
Nothingness is recognizing man’s minimization and, in it, precisely its 
possible grandeur.
Being so, and following Givone, “For Heidegger it is Nothingness 
which reveals the absolute sense of the Being”,26 for in it, it is possible to 
have an experience of the absolute since, “nothing is the nothing not of this 
or of that being but of the being in its totality”;27 and due to it, “Nothingness 
makes possible the evidence of the being as such for the human being”.28 
One should let oneself, therefore, be possessed by Nothingness, not so 
that things may lose their sense but rather to reconstruct it.
In the end, with Heidegger it is about questioning Being, but from 
the perspective of Nothingness and not only being.  It is clear that Heidegger 
considers Nothingness as equal in importance to Being. Nothingness in 
dialectic with the Being. Just as in Heidegger there is no being without 
Being and no Being without being, I would additionally assert that there 
is no Being without Nothingness, while Nothingness can be Nothingness 
even without Being. I do not connect Nothingness with the Being in the 
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same way as Heidegger, since what he considers on occasion as the Being, 
is what I consider Nothingness.
In any event, the Dasein is not the same as Nothingness but is in 
relation to it. Man’s conscience over its own Nothingness, the understanding 
of being constituted as a being in whose being its being fades, is the idea 
that Nothingness allows man’s being; it represents its Dasein. Man is 
always a possibility, never a reality. The possibility is always latent; a 
possibility always sustained by Nothingness, in whose imaginary arms 
human fragility is extended. Man may or may not become aware of this, 
but such conscience is independent to its being, or not, this way.
3. the result of Assuming nothingness in philosophical thought
Three more perspectives considering the significance of Nothingness 
for philosophy must be discussed. Firstly, Unamuno’s proposal, important 
in the history of philosophy, especially for recognizing, in spite of his 
Christian creed, the limitations of Christianism and the need of renewing 
it from a perspective that can manage to overcome nothingness through 
the absolute. From another perspective, the pessimistic vision derived 
from Nihilisim which, without a sketch of hope, recognizes the no-sense 
and fallacy of knowledge and of the future world. Bataille’s atheological 
summa, the perception of man as a “conscious nothing” in Cioran, Camus’ 
anarchism, and the recognition of the alienating chaos promoted by Caraco, 
are clear examples of it. In another corner, though with a similar beginning, 
centered on the primal hopelessness, an apology of Nihilism can be 
found in Vattimo which recognizes in nothingness itself, that which is so 
feared; an alternative for survival in a world whose primordial problem 
is the denial of emptiness as an experience which, if allowed, could help 
to sensitize and to construct new bridges of sense. 
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Unamuno and the impossibility of fusion with Nothingness
Miguel de Unamuno (1864-1936) was an important figure within 
the Spanish culture of the first-half of the twentieth century.  
Unamuno – coinciding with Kierkegaard – affirms that reason does 
not provide humanity with the ability to know and inquire about life in 
its profound essence. Instead, one has to appeal to the imagination and 
live in such a manner of foreseeing death. Thus to know life, which is 
temporary, Unamuno makes use of the ‘existential’ or ‘personal’ novel as 
a method. In his piece Del sentimiento trágico de la vida [Of the tragic 
sense of life], Unamuno briefly presents the sense of philosophizing:
At the starting point, at the true starting point, the 
practical not the theoretical one, of all philosophy, there is 
a: for what? The philosopher philosophizes for something 
more than philosophizing […] and since the philosopher 
is man before philosopher, he needs to live in order to 
philosophize; and, in fact, he philosophizes to live. And 
he usually philosophizes either to resign himself to life or 
to find some purpose in it, or for enjoyment and forgetting 
sorrows, or for sport and game.29
Further along, Unamuno critiques Descartes (and Sartre) over the 
issue of thinking as a condition of existing30 and establishes that before 
accepting the Cartesian ideas about the necessity of thinking to be able to 
exist, he would assume that sum ergo cogito; this is to say, that we exist 
and later think.  Two of the fundamental questionings of his philosophy are: 
“Would a pure thought actually be possible, without self-consciousness, 
without personality? Does pure knowledge actually take place without 
feeling, without this type of materialness that the feeling lends to it?”31 
My position is that because of the fact that thought has self-consciousness 
or personality, it is not pure, precisely because of the implication of such 
sentiments.
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Since Unamuno centers in on the material man of flesh and bone, 
he affirms that the greatest conscience possible is that of existence and, 
thus, one of the main desires will be to maintain it always; in other words, 
to become immortal. If the problem of personal immortality is man’s basic 
problem since “we cannot conceive ourselves as not existing”,32 and if 
the uncertainty with regard to an ultra-earthly existence is derived from 
it, then this uncertainty – in contrast with the intimate need for survival 
that man experiences – explains its agony as a state of the spirit which, 
in spite of everything, he has to “use”. In this “the tragic sentiment of 
existence” certainly consists.
Before the “ineffectiveness of Christianity”33 which usually 
provides simple, magical, and accessible answers before the problem 
of “the beyond”, man no longer has support between his desire of 
immortality and knowing that his time for existence is finite; and that, 
therefore, since in existence he is, he will cease to be. In the same way as 
“Christianity kills Western civilization, at the same time as this one to the 
other and that’s how they live, killing each other”34; in man, the desire of 
immortality kills him at the same time as death is that which breaks 
that desire. Living is tragic since it implies dying. This is what we can 
specifically relate to Nothingness, for the human desire to live always is, 
precisely, the tragic aspect of man’s life; a life which represents – furthermore 
– his impossibility of penetrating Nothingness and the paradoxical 
possibility of his plenitude as a function of Nothingness itself.
The Spanish philosopher strives to raise the debate over the 
physical man prior to the metaphysical one, the limited man prior to the 
super-man, the man that exists prior to thinking, and who thinks about his 
existence prior to the thought which engenders existence. Unamuno is the 
philosopher of the flesh and bone that takes existence, and its demands, 
to the starting point of all knowledge, or subsequent reflection.  
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Bataille, Cioran, Camus, and Caraco
The French Georges Bataille (1897-1962) constitutes one of the 
main representations of twentieth-century French Nihilism. In his work, 
the conscience that Nihilism inevitably accompanies us in each humanly 
constructed circumstance is observed. In his three main texts L’expérience 
intérieure, Le coupable, and Sur Nietzsche; which united are known as 
Summa atheologica; he clearly demonstrates the inevitable dailiness of 
Nothingness in human life.
Regarding Emile Cioran (1911-1995), we find ourselves with a 
thinker who fearlessly delves into the nausea of Nothingness. Someone 
who, such as Volpi says: “poisons all the ideals, hopes, and metaphysical 
rages of philosophy; this is to say, all attempts of anchoring existence 
into a single sense that calms it before the abysm of the absurdity, which 
threatens it at every moment”.35
Man for Cioran is “he who is not”; a conscious nothing in the world. 
The proximity of Cioran to the topic is centered on the inoperability of 
existence, which is tinged with literary images and effects. Today there 
is a flourishing of Cioran’s thought in Latin America, which is evidence 
of the translation of the majority of his works into Spanish.
Albert Camus (1913-1960) who has full conscience of his 
anarchist position underlying his own existentialist and nihilist reflection. 
More than the issue of Nothingness itself, Camus treats the issue of the 
absurdity of life, which has to do with the human incomprehension of the 
Nothingness that surrounds us as humans. In El mito de Sísifo [The myth 
of Sisyphus] he assumes that life is to be lived without explanations or 
reasons, once the gods have been silenced or died. Our rebellion would 
be, in any case, living in the face of this absurdity.
In turn, Albert Caraco (1919-1971) affirms that Being is nothing 
other thing than chaos and indifference, and that “the future will tell that 
the only clairvoyants were the anarchists and nihilists”.36 In his work 
Bréviaire du Chaos [Handbook of Chaos] we find not only a defense of 
Nothingness but a resignation before its supremacy. Many texts of this 
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philosopher (who in the end, put a blade to his throat and terminated his 
life) remain as yet unpublished. In a way, this demonstrates that Nihilism 
is not necessarily always a beginning of constructions.  
Gianni Vattimo and the apology of Nihilism
Some philosophers recognize in Nihilism something more than 
the manifestation of the contemporary era’s evils. Such is the case of the 
Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo (1936), who considers present-day 
man’s lack of conscience as the cause of the uneasiness in the face of 
Nothingness in daily life. The world is not sufficiently nihilist. Nihilism 
is not the problem, the problem is rather man’s lack of adaptation to this 
situation.  In his main writings like La muerte del sujeto [The death of the 
subject], La Posmodernidad [Post-Modernity], or El pensamiento débil 
[weak thought], he makes his nihilistic vocation noted and recognizes 
that metaphysics has ankylosed Western thought upon searching for 
categories that explain the Being, and forgotten that which can be beyond 
this scheme.  
Gianni Vattimo invites, summing up, to recognize present times 
and to assume the inexistence of unity in the perception of the real, the 
fragmentation of linguistic explanations, and the impossibility of absolute 
knowledge in certainty. We should not have nostalgia for the lost absolutism, 
nor should we feel resignation – which characterizes the existentialist 
thinkers – but, rather, we should embrace this new perspective, recognizing 
it as part of the progress of human understanding; an understanding that 
supposes the recognition of its own limits. It is precisely in the recognition 
of the inexplicable coming forth of new perceptions of reality, that the 
absolute principles are demolished.
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Conclusion
Although the Dasein that Heidegger proposes is not the same as 
nothingness, its reason for existence and the platform which sustains it 
can be found in nothingness. Without nothingness there is no Dasein 
and without it there would not be any Heideggerian philosophy. Human 
existence, therefore, cannot sustain itself if it is not through Nothingness. 
In a similar appoach, when Tanabe attributes the characteristic of dynamo 
to nothingness. Though Tanabe did not conclude, together with Nishida, 
the absoluteness of nothingness, he does recognize its generalized presence 
in order for all other things to be able to be. This also corresponds with 
Vattimo, who in a way performs a very interesting fusion of the Japanese 
vision with Heidegger’s, and shows us there is an urgent need to return 
attention to what nothingness means and what contemporary philosopher 
has neglected.
It could be that through finding a new inspiration to live in nothingness, 
upon utilizing it as a platform to create new meanings for existence, 
the contemporary individual may choose to maintain his or her faith, in 
Unamuno’s style, or definitely discard it as Camus or Cioran promoted; 
nevertheless, regardless of the final destiny of the philosophical reflections 
about nothingness, the feasibility of propitiating from it through a sensible 
and thinking election, which is the finality of all committed philosophy. 
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